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The Study of International Cultural Relations of Postwar Japan1
1. Framework of Analysis 
1-1. Introduction 
Masayoshi Ohira (1910-1980), Prime Minister of Japan from 1978 to 1980, 
was characterized as a prophet of the coming 1980s as well as the 21st century [Kumon 
1993].  In 1980, the year of his sudden death during his second term in office, Ohira 
allowed his advisory group to publish a paper called “The Age of Culture (Bunka no 
Jidai)”.  It was the time, so Ohira recognized, when Japan had caught up with the 
advanced Western societies in terms of modern economy and technology and was ready 
to step forward into the course of creative development with a philosophical basis of its 
own.  Ohira also regarded the earth as a single community with growing 
interdependence, and he insisted in his 1979 statements that the 1980s for Japan would 
be the age of culture as well as internationalization (kokusaika) [Ohira 1979a, 1979b].  
People refer to “culture” in the context of international relations when they 
face new challenges in an uncertain world.  The case of Japan is not an exception.  At 
the turn of the 20th century, when the concept of bunka (culture, Kultur) was imported 
from Germany, it soon became an intellectual keyword of the growing nationalism of 
the modern nation in construction, which desired to become a member of the society of 
“civilized (culturally enlightened) nations”.  Just after the defeat of WWII, the building 
of a “cultural state (bunka kokka)2” and rejoining the international community became 
the national slogan of Japan.  In the above example, Ohira recognized the ongoing 
transformation to modernity in the postwar world, and encouraged the Japanese people 
to open themselves up to the global community and to make a contribution to 
                                                 
1 The content of this paper is based on the result of co-research project by Study Group on International 
Cultural Relations of Postwar Japan (Sengo-Nihon Kokusai Bunka Koryu Kenkyuka,.) and published in 
Japanese as International Cultural Relations of Postwar Japan (co-authorship of the Study Group with 
editorial supervision by Kenichiro Hirano, Keiso Shobo publishers) in 2005.  It is a group of young 
Japanese and Korean researchers based at universities and research institutions in Japan. The members 
are Members (in alphabetical order) Maki AOKI-OKABE (Researcher, Institute of Developing 
Economies, Chiba), Yoko KAWAMURA (Associate Professor, Faculty of Humanities, Seikei University, 
Tokyo), Kyungmook KIM (Full-time Lecturer, College of Liberal Arts, Chukyo University, Nagoya), 
Sayaka KISHI (Research Fellow, Japan Society for the Promotion of Science) Toichi MAKITA (Professor, 
Obirin University, School of International Studies, Tokyo), 
2 In Japanese terms, “cultural state” refers to a state that pursues non-military, peaceful, and moral 
governance.  Here, “culture (bunka)” is used in a sense that derives from classical Chinese literature, 
rather than European/German sense of “Kultur.” 
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international cooperation by using the terms “culture” and “internationalization”.  
Today, at the starting point of the 21st century, international cultural relations are 
regarded in Japan as a priority by various government ministries in respective policy 
fields [Advisory Group for Prime Minister 2005; Commissioner's Advisory Group 
2003]. 
In the study of international relations, various approaches using the concept 
of culture – sometimes called “the Cultural Turn” in general – originate from the sense 
of crisis and uncertainty about fundamental research methods.  Our research project, 
“International Cultural Relations of Postwar Japan”, shares such methodological 
concern, but we focus on culture not only methodologically, but also examine cultural 
relations themselves as the object of study.  That is, we study cultural exchange and 
cultural cooperation in a broad sense, under a single concept of “international cultural 
relations” (in Japanese words, kokusai bunka koryu; thereafter abbreviated as ICR).  In 
our research we distinguish between two different dimensions of ICR, i.e., phenomenal 
and policy, and, as for the policy dimension, two different levels of ICR policies 
according to the agency (central/governmental and local/grass-roots).  We also pay 
special attention to the interaction of different dimensions and levels.  In doing so, we 
attempt to analyze the transformation to a sovereign nation-states system and the 
dynamics of the globalizing world from the level of human beings.  Such a broad and 
synthesized approach is becoming more and more important for social science in 
general – especially when our life is structurally transformed by the process of 
globalization, and at the same time, strong national sentiments seem to be growing. 
In the following sections, I would like to sketch out the framework of our 
study group’s analysis.  In the next section I survey the development of ICR-Studies in 
Japan, which has been backed by the societal development in postwar Japan since the 
late 1970s and 1980s – in Ohira’s words, the age of culture and internationalization.  
The Japanese concept of ICR is also briefly examined.  In section 3, I try to position 
our approach in the broader development of the “cultural turn(s)” in the study of 
international relations.  Sections 4 and 5 respectively examine the distinction of 
broad/narrow ICR, and summarize our analysis of the actual development of postwar 
Japanese ICR.  In the final part, the future agenda and general implication of our 
research are presented. 
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1-2. ICR-Studies: The Japanese Approach to Culture in International Relations 
The Japanese term “international cultural relations (kokusai bunka koryu)” 
is originally a practical one3.  It refers to various attempts of human beings to bring 
different cultural elements in contact – the word koryu, indeed, originally means a 
two-way flow of things, such as alternating flows of electricity4.  As described later, 
there are two dimensions in such human attempts – the policy (or activity) dimension, 
i.e., the activities and policies which intentionally aim to bring different cultures in 
contact (hereafter also referred to as “narrow ICR”), and the phenomenal (or factual) 
dimension, i.e., the whole transnational movement of people, goods, information, etc., 
with different cultural backgrounds (hereafter also referred to as “broad ICR”). 
After WWII, and especially since the mid-1970s, the Japanese society 
experienced a rapid development of ICR policies on different levels.  On the 
government level, the Japan Foundation was established in 1972; on the local level, 
“pioneer” prefectures such as Hokkaido, Kanagawa, etc., began to integrate 
international cooperation as a core policy of local governments.  In the 1980s, when 
the people of Western advanced industrial societies became interested in the cultural 
peculiarity of Japan5, while those in neighboring Asian countries became critical about 
Japan’s arrogance and insensitivity to history6, more and more Japanese, not only elites 
and intellectuals but also ordinary citizens, became aware of the need for cultivating 
human relations with people of different nations and cultures.  In the later 1980s, 
numerous citizen groups and semi-official bodies promoting ICR were created 
nationwide.  At the grassroots level, ICR was sometimes called simply kokusai koryu 
(international exchange); the term “culture” was omitted because the word bunka had a 
connotation of high culture and sounded too exclusive and elitist for some citizen 
                                                 
3 For a detailed examination of the concept, see [Kawamura 2005], Section 1. 
4 In dictionaries, the word Koryu is used as a Japanese translation of the English words “exchange” and 
“interchange”.  While “exchange” tends to mean a one-time swap, however, koryu has a connotation of 
constant contacts and mutual interaction. 
5 In 1979, the report of European Communities described Japan as “a country of workaholics living in 
rabbit hutches”.  In the same year, well-known books by Western Japanologists, such as Edwin O. 
Reischauer’s The Japanese and Ezra F. Vogel’s Japan as Number One, were published. 
6 Symbolical incidents are, among others, the heated debate on the descriptions of invasion and colonial 
dominance in Asia in Japanese history textbooks, and on the then Prime Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone’s 
visit to Yasukuni Shrine, where war dead for the country, including war criminals, are commemorated. 
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activists. 
Here, in the Japanese context, it is to be noted that the activities of ICR and 
“internationalization” (kokusaika) in general meant – at least in part – an effort towards 
Westernization (e.g. higher command of English language among Japanese citizens) and 
inner reform of the Japanese society to suit the “global standard” (e.g. bilingual signs in 
public spaces).  Such a posture of self-transformation in ICR is based on the 
experiences of Japanese modernization since the 19th century, which was often 
synonymous with Westernization.  This self-transforming characteristic of Japanese 
ICR policies contrasts with the “export-orientation” of American and Western-European 
ICR policies (public diplomacy, cultural diplomacy, foreign cultural policy, etc.), which 
focus on the spread of their own languages and the information of their own cultures to 
other peoples.  At the same time, the effort to open up Japanese minds and society to 
non-Western people had long been limited, especially at the central government level.  
It was in the late 1980s, and through the 1990s in particular, that general Japanese 
citizens became aware of the importance of developing dialogues and mutual relations 
with the people of neighboring Asian countries. 
Gradually, practitioners of ICR, but also some in academia, became 
interested in incorporating the activities of ICR as an object of the study of International 
Relations.  In 1984, the first seriously academic anthology that focused on the role of 
ICR in broader international relations was published by the Japan Institute of 
International Affairs [Saito et al.: 1984].  In the early 1990s, a research committee 
named “International Exchange (Kokusai Koryu)” was established by the Japan 
Association for International Relations (JAIR) as one of the Association’s specialized 
committees. 
After the bubble economy ended, the enthusiasm for ICR activities among 
the Japanese general public seemed temporarily to wane; however, the study of ICR 
persisted, with the attention on Samuel P. Huntington’s claim of a “clash of 
civilizations” [Huntington 1993, 1996] and upon the rapid development of ICR in the 
phenomenal dimension, i.e., the growing trend of globalization.  Indeed, since the 
latter half of the 1990s, the general interest in ICR policy was revived, this time as a 
tool for the revitalization of Japanese economy and for the better management of local 
communities, which were becoming more and more multicultural.  The attention to the 
former point is especially strong among government officials and business people, 
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backed by the publications of two American scholars: Joseph S. Nye’s work on “soft 
power” [Nye 2004] and Douglas McGray’s analysis on “Japanese cool” [McGray 
2002]. 
In spite of this growing attention to ICR activities in the Japanese society at 
large, only a small number of “pure academics” have seriously focused on ICR with the 
attention to its policy dimension as the object of study7.  Kenichiro Hirano, scholar of 
international relations at Waseda University (until 1998 at the University of Tokyo, 
Komaba), is one such rare academic that contributed to the development of 
ICR-studies8.  Originally a specialist of diplomatic history in modern Asia, Hirano was 
attracted to the acculturation theory of anthropology, and came to regard international 
relations in general (i.e., not only inter-state relations but also inter-societal or 
transnational relations) as “cultural relations” [Hirano 1976].  He also took an active 
part in the development of ICR activities in Japan, including the networking of 
grassroots ICR organizations and became a mediator between academia and 
practitioners.  In his 2000 publication, he summarized his analytical framework of 
ICR-studies [Hirano 2000]. 
The Study Group on International Cultural Relations of Postwar Japan has 
two interconnected origins.  One is a study group of graduate students at the 
University of Tokyo, started in the mid-1990s voluntarily by those who gathered in 
Hirano’s seminar9.  The other is a research project in the mid-1990s led by Hirano 
himself, which began as a working commission, on the request of the Japan Foundation, 
to draft a report on overall status of Japanese ICR policies toward ASEAN countries 
[University of Tokyo Study Group 1997].  The latter project evolved into a more 
                                                 
7 This does not mean that Japanese academia remained insensitive to overall ICR.  In JAIR, a research 
committee named “Transnational” was set up at about the same time as the committee “International 
Exchange” was established.  Today, the committee “Transnational” hosts numerous sociologists who are 
interested in movements of people across borders – in our terms, broad ICR –, analyzing migration and 
multiculturalism from the micro level.  
8 Apart from Hirano, the recent commitment of anthropologist Tamotsu Aoki at the National Graduate 
Institute for Policy Studies (GRIPS) on the policy study of ICR is noteworthy.  Aoki’s approach seems 
to be more practice-oriented than Hirano’s historical approach.  Other academics have been active as 
policy advisors of ICR, some of whom entered into the government, such as psychologist Hayao Kawai, 
currently the Commissioner for Cultural Affairs. 
9 Early works of some core members of the first days of this study group can be seen, among others, in 
[Hirano 1999]. 
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independent research project on the general development of Japanese ICR in the 
postwar period, funded by the Toyota Foundation; the project membership partly 
changed, with some younger researchers who participated in the voluntary study group 
at graduate school more recently.  The result of the work of this new project group, the 
Study Group on International Cultural Relations of Postwar Japan, was published in an 
anthology early this year [Study Group 2005].  In the following two sections, I try to 
position our approach in broader currents of the study of International Relations and to 
point out the unique features of our framework. 
 
1-3. The “Cultural Turns” and the Study of International Cultural Relations  
With the growing criticism of rationalist/positivist research methods as well 
as the rise of cultural studies, it has become fashionable among the scholars of social 
science to speak of “the Cultural Turn” in the respective research field.  In our view, 
one can recognize two currents if one looks closely at the flood of “cultural approaches”.  
That is, actually there seems to have been two “Cultural Turns,” i.e., the use of “culture” 
as the tool of study (Cultural Turn I) and as the object of study (Cultural Turn II). 
In the study of International Relations, the Cultural Turn I, the use of the 
concept of culture as a research tool, means the shift from rationalism and material 
power-political analysis (realism) to research methods that are more sensitive to 
different contexts defined by history, geography, ethnicity, gender, etc., and to norms 
and values in policymaking (see Figure 1).  The current from postmodernism to 
constructivism [Lapid & Kratochwil 1996], the application of literary criticism, 
sociology, cultural anthropology, etc., is representative thereof.  Since the latter half of 
the 1990s, scholars following this current have often favored to choose “non-cultural” 
themes, such as national security [Katzenstein 1996], for their case studies, in order to 
test the validity of their “cultural tool” in the fields that are traditionally advantageous to 
realists. 
The Cultural Turn II, the focus on “culture” as the object of study, 
overlaps partly with the first Cultural Turn, but can be recognized as a somewhat 
different tradition.  It is the shift of focus on state-centric analysis and hard politics to 
transnational activities of non-state or societal agents and various issue-oriented 
international cooperation – often inspired by the transformation of the actual world as a 
result of growing interdependence and globalization.  This trend of research is seen 
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most obviously in the studies of diplomatic history under the themes of “cultural 
internationalism” and “cultural diplomacy” [Iriye 1997, Gienow-Hecht 1999, 
Gienow-Hecht and Schumacher 2003, Scott-Smith and Krabbendam 2003].  Some 
currents of peace studies, such as WOMP and contributions to the journal Alternatives, 
seem to share the same interest.  The studies of civil society and of “global culture” 
(cultural globalization), whose thematic concern often derives from that of peace studies 
but which are not always considered as constitutional element of the “Cultural Turn” 
[Banba 1983, Featherstone 1990, Robertson 1992, Appadurai 1997, Boli and Thomas 
1999] are also regarded here as part of “Cultural Turn II”.  
There are some other “cultural approaches” in International Relations that 
deliberately do not use the term “culture” in their names.  Examples can be seen in the 
focus on social interactions [Deutsch 1966], on non-material dimensions of power 
politics [Nye 2004], and on the relations between values and conflicts [Huntington 
1996].  The overall locations of various cultural approaches according to the two 
“Cultural Turns” are indicated in the Figure 2. 
In this map, the positioning of Japanese ICR-Studies is on the upper far 
right.  That is, we attempt to synthesize the two “Cultural Turns” by using analytical 
tool of historical analysis, sociology, cultural anthropology (acculturation), cultural 
studies, etc., and at the same time, focusing on ICR as both phenomenon and policy as 
the object of study (see section 4). 
 
1-4. International Cultural Relations as Phenomenon and Policy (Figure 3) 
As mentioned earlier, the uniqueness of our approach lies in discerning 
different dimensions and levels of ICR as the object of study.  That is, we distinguish 
between the broad (phenomenal/factual) and narrow (policy/activity) dimensions of 
ICR according to the intentions of agents, as well as between national 
(central-governmental) and non-state (local, grassroots) levels of ICR according to 
different kinds of agents promoting ICR. 
The phenomenal/factual dimension of ICR (broad ICR, ICR as 
phenomenon) refers to people, goods, money, information, ideas, etc., that move, or 
“flow,” across borders.  These transnational movements occur as a result of various 
individual objectives such as building career and friendship, gaining profit and 
popularity, or satisfying one’s curiosity and desire; since these movements occur across 
7 
national and cultural borders, they necessarily involve the contact and interchange 
among different nationals and cultures, thus consisting of “culture contacts,” or 
“cultural relations” in a broad sense.  One may say that the broad ICR is another word 
for the ongoing globalization itself, if one wants to use the popular term.  
In postwar Japan, the development of broad ICR especially since the 
1970s/1980s was regarded as a great shock – and, sometimes, even a threat – in society 
in general because many Japanese had taken it for granted that Japan consisted of 
overwhelmingly homogeneous populations with strong in-group identities according to 
family (iye), local community (mura), school, company, etc.  The growing 
international reputation of Japanese industrial products brought about sense of pride 
among the Japanese people, but the criticisms by foreigners on the exclusiveness of 
Japanese society (later also termed “Japan bashing”) caused serious identity crisis 
among intellectuals as well as among the general public.  Some, however, especially 
the people of postwar generations and local activists, regarded this crisis as a chance to 
construct an open, democratic society that commits itself to international cooperation 
and understanding.  On the other hand, some politicians such as Ohira (see section 1) 
and Yasuhiro Nakasone (prime minister 1982-1987) tried to take this opportunity for 
Japan to assume a stronger national pride and an active leadership in international 
relations.  Such undertakings, both on the societal and governmental level, resulted in 
active practices of ICR policies and activities described next. 
The policy/activity dimension of ICR (narrow ICR, ICR as 
policy/activity) refers to various international exchange and cooperation activities, or 
international cultural policies of various social agents.  These activities and policies 
make up a part of broader ICR, but they are peculiar in that they deliberately create 
contact between various people and cultures10.  Although called koryu (alternating 
flow) in Japanese terms, narrow ICR can in fact be both two-way mutual interactions 
and one-way “export” or “import” of cultures.  
When analyzing narrow ICR, we recognize a variety of agents, or levels, of 
ICR.  Narrow ICR level 1 consists of international cultural policies of national 
                                                 
10 In fact, it is not always easy to make a clear demarcation between broad and narrow ICRs.  There are 
“gray zones” such as the case of exchange students, who in the first place go to foreign countries for their 
own personal cause (e.g. better career opportunity), but sometimes gradually start to recognize 
themselves as mediators between nations and cultures, therefore as “practitioners of ICR activities”. 
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governments (foreign cultural policy and internationalization of inland culture-related 
policies).  Narrow ICR Level 2 consists of international cultural policies and 
activities carried out by non-state agents (NGOs/NPOs, local governments, individuals, 
etc.).   
In the case of Japan, ICR activities began in the immediate postwar period 
as primarily non-governmental (level 2), idealistic international movements such as 
world federation movements, UNESCO movements, etc.  In the shadow of the Cold 
War, educational and intellectual exchange activities with the US soon dominated, with 
active support by the American government (level 1, e.g. Fulbright Programs) and by 
American private foundations (level 2, e.g. the establishment of major Japanese private 
international cultural organizations supported by the Rockefeller and Ford Foundations).  
In the 1970s, when the US suddenly took a major change in her foreign policy and the 
people in other Asian countries became critical of Japan, the Japanese government 
began to make some efforts to practice ICR policy.  The main “target countries” of 
such “level 1” ICR were the United States and Southeast Asian (ASEAN) countries, not 
immediate neighbors such as China and Korea, with whom Japan had problems of the 
traumatic past of the highest magnitude.  ICR activities with China and Korea as 
partners developed only in later years, primarily from level 2, when broader ICR in 
general grew within Northeast Asia, and when Japanese people looked to foreign 
residents originating from such countries as fellow citizens. 
In our research project, we have paid particular attention to the interactions 
of different dimensions and levels of ICR (see Figure 3).  For example, agents pursue 
narrow ICR in order to adapt to the development of broad ICR; the trend of broad ICR 
are often set by the policies of narrow ICR; non-state agents pursue ICR activities in 
order to make a better life in the multicultural world and to reform the state-centric 
world order; national governments pursue ICR policy in order to promote, to 
complement, to compete with or to counter ICR activities by non-state agents; and, 
finally, state and non-state agents can coordinate their activities and form a (loose) 
coalition in order to achieve common objectives. 
 
1-5. The Experiences of International Cultural Relations of Postwar Japan  
With such notions of ICR in mind, and making use of “culture” both as the 
tool and the object of study, the Study Group examined the experiences of ICR in 
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postwar Japan.  The detailed stories of level 1 and level 2 ICRs are depicted in the 
second and third chapters respectively.  Here in this section, the main findings of our 
research are enlisted in the form of four points. 
 
(1) Narrow ICR as the Construction of Identity 
Altogether, international cultural relations can be regarded as the 
consequence as well as the process of human pursuits to identify the self in 
contemporary international society.  In the case of Japan, the policies and activities of 
cultural exchange/cooperation since WWII have been the pursuits of people at all levels 
of society to position “us (Japan, the Japanese)” in the postwar world11.  Particularly in 
the early period, the location of “us” was conceived vis-à-vis “the West” – practically, 
the United States.  Neighboring countries in Asia were not regarded as equal partners 
or the members of the same community.  It is also to be remembered that throughout 
the Cold War period, the main “target countries” of Japanese cultural policies were 
Southeast Asian (ASEAN) countries, not her immediate neighbors such as Korea and 
China [Study Group 2005: Chapters 1and 2]. 
As the time passed, however, new trends of cultural relations came out, 
initiated by local and nongovernmental agents (level 2).  People looked to their Asian 
neighbors in the pursuit of issue-oriented cooperation and of making better communities 
both locally and internationally [idem.].  Here it is interesting to pay attention to the 
people’s awareness of the multi-culturalization of Japanese society since the 1980s and 
the special roles played by foreign residents in Japan, such as Korean permanent 
residents (“zainichi”), in the emerging new cultural relations in Asia; and also, to the 
formation of new image of multilayered and multidimensional “us” among Japanese 
citizens as the result of developments in both broad and narrow ICRs [ibid.: Chapter 3, 
Section 3]12. 
 
                                                 
11 Peter Katzenstein states in his recent work that “(th)rough cultural diplomacy, … governments seek to 
present specific images to support or alter existing state identities” [Katzenstein 2005: 38]. His statement 
here refers mainly, in our terms, to narrow ICR level 1; we think that the same thing can be said regarding 
level 2 ICR activities. 
12 It should be noted, however, that like in Europe, “anti- (Asian-) migrant” sentiments have at the same 
time been growing among the general public, being influenced by the voices of some conservative 
politicians such as Shintaro Ishihara, the mayor of Tokyo Metropolitan City. 
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(2) Interaction between Different Dimensions and Levels of ICR 
Another major finding is that there have been constant interactions between 
different dimensions and levels of ICR. 
In the case of postwar Japanese ICR, the most significant of such 
interaction was the gradual change of government ICR policies (level 1) that occurred in 
the 1990s, influenced both by level 2 ICR and by “broader ICR.”  In the 1980s, when 
the “economic giant” faced the rapid increase of transnational flows of people, goods, 
information, etc., Japanese grassroots agents (level 2) had began to actively cooperate 
with their Asian neighbors in the form of networking, joint artistic production, etc., and 
to construct equal partnerships in the larger regional community.  This cooperative and 
reciprocal technique of ICR activities was, later in the 1990s, adopted by the central 
government and incorporated in its national cultural diplomacy (level 1) [ibid.: Chapters 
1 and 2].   
The personal connection between different levels of narrow ICRs is also 
noteworthy.  For example, Japan-American exchange programs sponsored by Japanese 
and American nonprofit organizations (level 2 ICR) resulted in a network of 
intellectuals, business elites, politicians and government officials supportive of 
government ICR policies (level 1 ICR) [ibid.: Chapter 5]. 
 
(3) ICR as Cultural Encounter 
As stated in section 2, ICR originally means the efforts to bring different 
cultural elements into contact.  Such undertakings necessarily accompany the process 
of cultural encounters.  In the Japanese case, various new cultural elements were 
brought into the Japanese society as a result of ICR activities.  The reception and 
development of the concept of civil society (shimin shakai) is a prime example of such 
acculturation [ibid.: Chapter 3]. 
In retrospect, the ICR activities in postwar Japan have developed hand in 
hand with the construction of a “Japanese version” of civil society.  Those who were 
involved in Japan-American intellectual exchange programs during the time of the Cold 
War, which were backed by major American foundations, became an active promoter of 
the concept of civil society in Japan.  In more recent years, the experiences of 
cooperation and networking over Asia produced a unique philosophy of grassroots 
activities; in development cooperation, for example, Japanese NGOs show greater 
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attention to cultural difference and self-reliance.  It was through these grass-roots 
initiatives for international cultural exchange and cooperation – with the West as well as 
with Asia – that the Western concept of civil society was fused with a unique Japanese 
(or Asian) value and incorporated into Japanese society as an ordinary term of practice. 
 
(4) Comparison of Japan/Asia and Germany/Europe 
In our research project, the commitment of Japan in Asian regional cultural 
cooperation and that of Germany in European cultural cooperation were compared 
[ibid.: Chapter 2].  Both countries have made efforts to make use of ICR in order to 
establish a new identity in the postwar contemporary world. 
When contrasted with the experiences of the Federal Republic of Germany, 
which was located at the forefront of the Cold War and made (or, had to make) constant 
commitments to European cultural cooperation according to the “grand strategy” to 
embed herself in Europe, the hesitation of Japan in constructing ICR, and especially its 
unnatural disproportion in her setting of target countries of ICR, was striking.  While 
Germany seemed to be successful in establishing an identity of “Germany in Europe,” 
Japan remains somewhat outside of other Asian countries – indeed, people often speak 
of “Japan and Asia,” but not “Japan in Asia.” 
This contrast stems partly from the historical and geopolitical difference 
between the two countries, which created unfavorable conditions for Japan to develop 
ICR in Asia.  We must say, however, that with all these objective disadvantages, 
Japanese policymakers still lacked a general will, or the initiative, to build constructive 
relationships with neighboring countries based on mutual trust.  The most serious 
problem for Japan today is that it has no major regional partner comparable to France 
for Germany.  In recent years, some ICR initiatives on both level 1 and level 2 have 
been taken to build a future-oriented relationship with Korea and China based on 
dialogue on historical issues, such as joint research project of historians and the edition 
of common history teaching materials, which we hope will become the cornerstone of 
regional partnerships. 
 
1-6. The Implication of ICR-Studies and the Future Research Agenda 
Japanese ICR-Studies, though still in the making, seem to show some 
unique features in the development of the cultural approach in the study of International 
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Relations.  It would, for example, methodologically be useful to distinguish between 
culture as a tool and culture as an object of study, and to synthesize the two “Cultural 
Turns” in full intention.  Our key concept of ICR, with awareness of different 
dimensions and levels of “cultural relations” and their mutual interactions, is unique in 
its inclusiveness and elaboration necessary for the analysis of multidimensional and 
multilayered international relations of our age.  The Japanese term “Koryu” might 
sound somewhat esoteric to Western scholars, but the use of this concept is appropriate 
in the moral and political context of today in that it provides us more focus on the 
possibility of mutuality and reciprocity of intercultural activities.  
The agenda for our future research can be summarized in three brief points.  
First, we need more case studies; especially ICR in their phenomenal/factual dimension 
and their interaction with policy/activity dimension must further be analyzed.  With 
regard to narrow ICR, the position of ICR policy in general governmental policy fields 
should be examined.  Here, we could have fruitful cooperation with scholars of other 
research fields, such as historians, sociologists, and researchers of general International 
Relations. 
Secondly, it is obvious that we need more theoretical/methodological 
improvement.  We should develop connections with related approaches in broader 
(including Western) academia.  Through such interactions, we also hope to refine the 
term “culture” in general in the study of International Relations.   
Thirdly, and related to the first and second agenda, we need to develop a 
broader network of ICR-Studies.  Since ICR especially in its narrow sense is a field 
strongly connected to social practice, we have been inviting ICR policy practitioners, 
such as staff of the Japan Foundation, local international associations, etc., to the 
Research Commission within the Japan Association of International Relations for 
dialogue and discussion.  In Japanese academia our group is still young and small, but 
we hope to extend this network of researchers and practitioners also internationally. 
Today, Ohira’s prophecy seems to have come true in a somewhat ironic 
form.  Indeed, we find ourselves in “the Age of Culture,” facing a crisis of 
multicultural co-existence and waves of fierce nationalism.  The ICR approach is to 
prove its analytical strength as a synthesis of two Cultural Turns.  At the same time, 
the study of ICR is not, and must not be, a mere “science of the academics, by the 
academics, for the academics”. 
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In the Japanese language, “culture (bunka)” originally means a way of 
government with non-military power of morality.  This concept of culture with a 
nuance of peacemaking and social reform derives from classical Chinese literature, and 
is shared broadly among the people of Asia.  With this Asian concept of culture in 
mind, we endeavor to conduct research that helps us understand the dynamics of 
international relations in terms of complex cultural encounters, and present a hint to 
develop better ICR, both in its narrow and broad sense, in the actual global community. 
 
 
2. National Commitment to Regional Cultural Cooperation in Asia and Europe 
 
This chapter examines the development of national commitment to 
international cultural relation policies (hereafter referred as ICR policy) within a 
regional framework.  In the modern era, one of the mainstreams of ICR policy by 
nation states has been public diplomacy which constructs its own “national culture” by 
projecting it both inward and outward.  Recently, there appeared another trend: that is, 
interactive ICR policy among nations within the regional framework. 
“Region” is defined here as a group that consists of more than a single 
nation-state.  It will be defined by the perception of the peoples who live within it, 
especially of the national policymakers.  In other words, interaction among people and 
“we-feeling (collective identity)” formed as a result will be potent factors for region 
building [Oba 2004: Chapter 1].  ICR policy projects are closely related with 
development of “we-feeling,” in the sense that they are intended to bring people into 
direct contact with what is “foreign” for them.  Today, regional ICR policies are 
implemented across issues ranging from mutual understanding, science and technology 
to sometimes political issues like human rights.  In this chapter, we would like to put 
such broad ranges of projects together under a single term as “regional cultural 
cooperation (here referred as RCC),” and try to correlate them with regions as social 
constitution. 
Why do the national policymakers conduct RCC? Is there any pattern of 
RCC?  Here we try to answer those questions by comparing Japanese RCC toward 
Asia with Germany’s case in Europe. 
After the end of World War II, while burdened by defeat and national 
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division, Germany started ICR policy aiming at “rehabilitation of national prestige” and 
reconciliation with neighboring nations.  Reentering into international society was a 
big challenge for postwar Japan also.  Japanese government under occupation by 
Allies launched ICR polices from a quite similar compulsion to Germany’s.  It is to be 
noted however, that throughout Cold War period, main target countries of Japanese ICR 
policies were the US and Southeast Asian nations, not her immediate neighbors such as 
South Korea and China, with whom Japan had problems of the traumatic past.  Japan’s 
RCC has been developed in seemingly “distorted” form, when compared with the West 
Germany, which has been engaged in RCC in a partnership with France.  This 
“disproportion” reflects the struggle inherent in Japanese policymakers over how they 
identify themselves in international society.  What keeps the Japanese policymakers 
away from forging a regional partnership with their immediate neighbors, then? 
The problem that besets Japan with her neighbors will be even more 
striking through the comparison with the case of Germany, which was another 
latecomer to the game of international politics, and another “problem in the region,” but 
developed a totally different pattern of RCC in the postwar era. 
 
2-1. Regional Cultural Cooperation and National Identity 
Since the late 1990s, the idea that the perception of individuals determines 
the dynamics of international relations has come into the spotlight in International 
Relations [Katzenstein 1996, Lapid and Kratochwil 1996, Wendt 1999].  Some of them 
especially focused on the perception about the world that one lives in, and about the 
relations between selves and others.  This chapter also pays attention to such 
perception about selves and others, and defines it as identity.  We then focus on ICR, 
which was out of touch with the IR studies mentioned above.  Our point here is that 
ICR policies can be the clue to study the process of constructing/ re-constructing 
identities.  More concretely, RCC is pursued by policymakers to construct the national 
collective identity.  Conversely, RCC involving cross-sectoral public can modify the 
policymakers’ original identity.  Therefore, they can control the image of themselves 
both in eyes of people overseas and their own by ICR policies [Banba 1983]. 
National policymakers can use RCC as a tool to construct positive identity.  
By promoting RCC under the concept of “unity in diversity,” for example, they can 
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guarantee the uniqueness of national “selves” within a larger framework.  On the other 
hand, they can appeal both at home and abroad the positive image of “selves” by taking 
initiative in the international RCC policy making process.  It is should be noted that 
one can thus fortify national identities through commitment to RCC.  
For the cases of Germany and Japan, the policymakers started with 
negative identities as “defeated countries” or “ex-invaders” in the postwar world.  
Under such circumstances, it was considerably difficult to pursue ICR policies as 
independent “national” projects as France or the US did.  As a result, the both 
countries tried to transform their negative identities into positive ones through active 
commitment to ICR policies in collaboration with neighboring countries.  Nevertheless, 
as we will show later, RCC in each case drew sharp contrast.  
In this chapter, we would like to examine RCC from two different 
perspectives.  The former is the structure of partnership; whether they pursue 
hierarchical order lead by hegemonic power, or equal partnership.  The latter is 
emphatic point of the projects. When one emphasizes the uniqueness and autonomy of 
each unit, the region will be the one like Karl Deutsch’s famous concept of a pluralistic 
security community.  When one focuses on the commonality of the members, in 
contrast, they will be lead to a framework like a well-integrated nation state.13) As for 
RCC, their contents and outcomes, and even the style of policymaking are closely 
dependent on these two points.  
Paying attention to those points, we will analyze the case of “Germany in 
Europe” and “Japan and Asia” in the following sections. 
 
2-2. German Commitment to European Cultural Cooperation 
For the policymakers of postwar Germany, “Europe” was an essential basis 
of their identity.  Referring to the identity as “Germany in Europe” propounded by 
Elizabeth Pond, “Europe” as a “niche” for postwar Germany has even been fortified 
though the membership of the region varies across the ages [Katzenstein 1996: 33]. 
In the later period of occupation, the future major figures of the German 
public ICR agencies gathered in the Wiesbaden Working Circle and envisaged postwar 
                                                 
13) See [Deutsch et al. 1957]. 
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ICR policies as the renaissance of the German nation based on Europe.  There they 
envisioned to promote fundamental research of “abendlandische Kultur” and the 
European integration movement history within the supranational framework.  More 
noteworthy was the point that the ideas of “renovation of Germany” and “internal 
renaissance of the German nation” were strongly related to the Europe-oriented cultural 
projects (Kawamura 1999a). 
It was in the 1960s when the German-Franco partnership was built, and it 
worked as a pivot for European Cultural Cooperation thereafter.  As Treaty of 
Friendship and Cooperation between France and Germany signed in 1963, bilateral ICR 
policies between two nations started.  Activities such as youth exchange programs 
allowed for international art collaboration and language learning.  Aiming at 
promotion of mutual understanding among the citizens, the projects involved a wide 
range of people from both countries.  Besides, beneath those national ICR policies 
underlay the various patterns of exchange programs at the grass-roots level since the 
occupation [Farquharson and Holt 1975]. 
Thus the postwar German ICR policies were prefaced with the bilateral 
exchanges with neighboring countries aiming at rapport.  Curiously, the public opinion 
research unexpectedly reported that it was the awareness of being “European” that was 
promoted as a result of such bilateral ICR policies [op.cit.: 189-191]. 
In the 1980s, German commitment to the European Cultural Cooperation 
was further enhanced under the initiative by Hans-Dietrich Genscher.  As is well 
known, he assumed the position of Minister of Foreign Affairs as Education of EC was 
published by the EC committee under Ralf Dahrendorf who lead the Directorate 
General of Research, Science and Education within the committee.  Education of EC 
advocated introduction of “Europe Term” to the education program in EC member 
countries as well as facilitation of teachers and students’ international activities in the 
regions.  Thus the report aimed to foster the sense of the region among the individuals 
in EC through ensuring the equal right of education regardless of nationalities, which 
Dahredolf regarded as essential for European citizenship. 
Backed by the trend in the 1970s, the German RCC after the 1980s was 
marked by the aspiration for a comprehensive European identity, which was based on 
the idea that “German identity”, whether it was West Germany or a hypothetical “united 
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Germany,” could not be realized without “Europe” which surrounds and sustains it.  
Although the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Berlin Wall in 1989 expanded 
the realm of “Europe” both geographically and conceptually, the position of “Europe” 
remains central in the pursuit of Germany’s national identity in international society.  It 
is to be noted, however, that the gravity in the German RCC has on the gradual shift 
from German-Franco pivot to hypothetical “Mitteleuropa” [Kawamura 2005].  
German commitment to post war European cultural cooperation can be 
summarized as continuous enterprise to embed Germany within the framework of 
“Europe.”  Emphasis on “Europe” as an identity enhanced the national framework and 
vice-versa.  Active involvement in RCC within the “European” framework helped 
Germany to get rid of the distrust of neighbors toward the “successor of the Nazis.” It 
eased tensions among the members, and even established regional relations centered on 
Germany herself 14 ) Behind this background, there was the fact that determinant 
problems for the German state and society have been intricately intertwined with the 
international environment in Europe.
Above all, European Cultural Cooperation as a “grand strategy” for 
German ICR policies was supported by bilateral cooperation with regional members 
who were under historical tensions.  Overcoming antagonism from the pre-modern era, 
Germany and France have built a partnership which played a pivotal role for the 
European cultural cooperation, and they contributed to European Identity as a result.  
As for “Mitteleuropa” countries, Poland for example, continued textbook dialogue with 
Germany since the 1970s and now is an important RCC partner in Eastern Europe 
[Nishikawa 1992: Part II].  Interestingly, those quiet dialogue processes brought up 
participants of the international cultural exchange programs into leaders of the next 
generations, and they promoted RCC further.  Moreover, those bilateral ICR policies 
are characterized by equal partnership among the parties, aiming at co-prosperity by 
respecting the uniqueness of one another. 
 
2-3. Japanese Commitment to RCC in Asia 
                                                 
14) Markovits and Reich [Markovits and Reich1993] likened united Germany in Europe to Gramsci’s 
hegemony. 
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1) ICR policies as a tool for “Contribution to international society” 
Compared with Germany’s case, what is distinctive about the ICR policies 
between Japan and other Asian nations is the duplex “disproportion” of its structure.  
One of its points is the overemphasis of Southeast Asian nations as RCC partners, more 
precisely, the members of Association of Southeast Asian Nations (here referred as 
ASEAN).  While Europe is defined as a region including Germany herself, Japan 
obviously stands out of Southeast Asia, not even a member of ASEAN.  It should be 
that a group consists of both Northeast and Southeast Asian countries that forms a 
counterpart of Europe in Germany’s case.  Nevertheless Japan’s RCC started and 
developed in the form of projects for Southeast Asian nations. 
Another is the relationship with the US.  ICR policies by postwar Japan, 
both at governmental and grass-roots level, started as occupation by the Allies, and 
developed as a response to the US.  Beneath the Japanese commitment to RCC, 
underlays a peculiar identity which considers the Japanese people as “we who 
contribute to security in Southeast Asia, which is the area of responsibility under the 
umbrella of the US.” In other words, “Asia” represented by Southeast Asia has been a 
target rather than an active partner for “contribution to international society.”  
Just after the end of the war, Japanese policymakers regarded ICR policies 
as a measure for re-entering international society.  For example, Naruhiko Higasikuni, 
the first prime minister of postwar Japan, envisaged in his diary to establish “new Japan 
as a democratic, peaceful, morally and culturally enlightened nation,” and “to 
reconstruct Japan into the supreme contributor to the worldwide disarmament, peace 
and welfare of mankind” [Higashikuni 1957: 200-201].  It is interesting that such 
aspiration was espoused inside and outside the government15, and that they regarded 
“cultural diplomacy” as a measure to change their negative national identity as a 
“defeated country” into a positive one as “the contributor.” Interestingly, they imagined 
Asian nations as partners for “contribution”.16)
                                                 
15 As for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, they upheld “renewal of cultural policy” together with political 
and economic reconstruction in “the Plan for Voluntary and Immediate Policy Enforcement” which was 
drawn up in 1945 as a counter plan for occupation by the Allies. As for non-government actions, Legal 
scholars Eiichi Makino and Asao Odaka insisted in their co-writing Theory of Cultural Nation: Power to 
Make Law on developing the independency and uniqueness of their nation in order to “promote diversity 
and fairness in the international community.”  
16) Mamoru Shigemitsu, who was the Foreign Minister of Higashikuni administration, regarded the newly 
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Thirst for being a “contributor to international society,” however, did not 
move into action during the occupation.  It took shape after the Japanese national 
sovereignty was fully restored, and formed the foundation for Japan’s ICR policies 
thereafter.  As the San Francisco Peace Treaty was signed in 1951, Japan embarked on 
economic interaction via trade and investment with Southeast Asian countries along 
with the US strategy to build anti-communist block in Asia [Hirano 1985; Shimizu 
2001: 78-101].  The surge of goods, money, and people among Japan and Southeast 
Asia gradually increased international cultural exchange and cooperation projects for 
those countries. For example, admission of students and exchange of youth from 
Southeast Asia (began in 1959 by the Management and Coordination Agency of Japan) 
started as part of the Postwar Compensation toward the invaded nations begun in 1954. 
Those ICR policies toward Southeast Asia, as the speeches by the prime ministers of the 
period show, were implemented as the lubricant of economic interactions rather than a 
tool to constitute a regional collective identity17. 
It was in the 1970s when the Japanese policymakers strongly recognized 
the need to emphasize cultural ties with Southeast Asia.  The government embarked on 
the RCC aiming to construct “Asia” which includes both Japan and Southeast Asia.  In 
1972 the Japan Foundation (referred as JF) was established as a national ICR agency 
with the purpose of promoting international cultural exchange and cooperations,  
a) to promote Japan as a “peaceful nation ” to the international society, 
b) to promote domestic understanding of other countries and cultures, 
c) to contribute to the advancement of technology and well-being in developing 
countries  
[Japan Foundation 1986, MOFA Cultural Project Division 1973] 
 
What is important here is that ICR policies was envisioned to include not 
only art and humanities but also technological assistance, and explicitly defined as a 
                                                                                                                                               
independent Southeast Asian nations as partners to establish the politically and culturally independent and 
prosperous “Asia” through nonmilitary measures such as cultural cooperation [Sato 1999: 171]. 
17 In the speeches of Premiers in this period, the term “culture” is always accompanied with “economy”, 
shown as “cooperation in the economic-cultural field”(Tanzan Ishibashi at the26th Diet, Feb. 1957), 
“economic cooperation and cultural partnership”(Shinsuke Kishi at the 27th Diet, Nov. 1957), “active 
exchange both in the economic and cultural field with friends”（Hayato Ikeda at 39th Diet Sep. 1961）See 
[Hirano 1985: 351]. 
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tool to contribute to the world’s welfare.  Moreover, the US and Southeast Asian 
countries were envisaged as major targets of the activities18).  It was followed by the 
establishment of “the Ship for Southeast Asian Youth Program” in 1974, and financial 
support to the ASEAN’s cultural cooperation, which was initiated by Premier Takeo 
Fukuda, who propounded “heart to heart communication” among ASEAN and Japan, in 
his famous message toward ASEAN called the “Fukuda Doctrine.” 
Events in the world that occurred around 1970 triggered these 
transformations of Japanese ICR policies.  One jolt was the restoration, unexpected by 
the Japanese, of full relations between the US and China, and the so-called oil-shocks.  
Japan’s views on both were markedly different from those of the US.  It was at the 
Japan-US Joint Economic Conference held a year after President Nixon’s visit to China 
when the Prime Minister Fukuda proposed establishment “for enhancement of mutual 
understanding between Japan and the US.” In other words, reform of ICR policies in the 
1970s was started primarily to bridge the communication gap with the US. 
Another was growing economic friction with Southeast Asian nations.  
The rapid deployment of Japanese corporations, in parallel with a flood of “made in 
Japan” products in Southeast Asian markets, increased mistrust among local peoples 
there.  Boycotts of Japanese products in Thailand in 1972, together with an 
anti-Japanese riot in Indonesia during the Premier’s tour to ASEAN members in 1974 
strongly impressed the Japanese policymakers on the limit of conventional 
economy-biased diplomacy.  Those shocks provoked initiatives to new ICR policies, 
which focused on confirming cultural ties between Japan and Southeast Asia19. 
Southeast Asian countries, at this juncture, were regarded by the Japanese 
policymakers not only as economic partners; it was also an area to fulfill her 
responsibilities in international society as a junior partner of the US.  Fukuda and his 
advisors in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs envisioned that there arose a space for Japan 
                                                 
18) It was obviously stated in the response by Fukuda (Foreign Minister at the time) at the Lower House 
Foreign Affairs Committee on March 15th 1972 [Compilation Committee for Fifteen year’s History of 
Japan Foundation 1990: 235].  
19 Prospective and Retrospective of International Exchange,(Kokusaikoryu no Genjo toTenbo) [MOFA 
Cultural Project Division 1973], a preparatory report for the establishment of JF, stressed the importance 
of Southeast Asia as the target for Japanese ICR policies, and pointed out the urgent need to correct the 
“wrong image of Japan” such as “an economic animal.” Similar opinions can be found in Fukuda and 
figures in his camp. See [Nisiyama 1978] e.g. 
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to play a “political role” after the withdrawal of the US forces from Asia.  To speak 
precisely, “the role” was targeted to stabilize the relationship in Southeast Asia by two 
measures: by bridging communist Indochina and ASEAN, and by supporting the 
development of ASEAN nations [Tanaka 1999].  ICR policies were the only 
diplomatic tool available without feeding the fire in Asian nations.  In fact, the 
decades-cherished desire for the “Japan as a contributor to the world well-being” was 
fulfilled when it found Southeast Asia as its area of activities.  To put it differently, it 
meant that the structure of relationship among “the regional members” was assumed a 
hierarchical one with Japan as a regional leader who provides technological or political 
support. 
The Japanese “political role” was, however, forced to turn about at the end 
of the 1970s by an unexpected invasion by Vietnam of Cambodia.  As the Soviet 
Union’s invasion of Afghanistan stoked international tension in the so-called New Cold 
War, Japan refrained from a role of bridge-builder in Southeast Asia, and emphasized 
her position as “a member of the Western camp.”  
 
2) Silent Change in the 1980s 
As Japanese “political roles” receded, the weight of RCC in Japanese foreign policy 
apparently decreased.  Figure 1 shows that the appropriation for the JF remained on 
the same level until 1987 [Compilation Committee for Fifteen year’s History of Japan 
Foundation 1990, pp. 222-223, The University of Tokyo Study Group on International 
Cultural Relations 1999: 29].  Despite the quantitative downturn, Japanese ICR itself 
experienced qualitative transformation in this era.  The change was characterized by 
the following points: rapid rise of non-national agents of ICR, a surge of two-way 
interaction, the emergence of issue-oriented projects, and collaboration among various 
agencies such as the national and local government, NGOs and individuals.  
As the following chapter reports, NGOs and local governments in the 
1980s eagerly incorporated ideas and methods of international cultural exchange and 
cooperation through the interaction with agencies of Europe and the US.  What is 
interesting here is that those Japanese agencies exercised such ideas in the activities 
with Asian counterparts.  Such collaborative style of ICR projects was a fresh 
departure from the conventional national RCC viewing Southeast Asian nations just as 
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“targets.” 
Those new movements at the non-national level were soon incorporated 
into national policies via collaboration between national and non-national ICR agencies.  
As aforementioned, JF’s budget remained plateaued at that time.  JF embarked to 
collaborate with other agencies and to outsource part of its projects in order to 
overcome its fiscal limit [Compilation Committee for Fifteen year’s History of Japan 
Foundation 1990: 50].  JF Prizes for Community-Based Cultural Exchange (since 
1985) and various collaborations with local governments and agencies, for example, 
worked as channels to absorb methods and ideas at non-national levels, and 
cross-sectoral networks were built as a result.  Thus the idea of collaboration and 
interactive style became a nation-wide trend of ICR, and the agencies practiced them in 
the projects with Asian nations.  
 
3) Revival and Renewal: RCC in the end of 1980s  
In the latter 1980s, RCC toward Asia came back into spotlight at the 
national level.  No sooner than his assumption of premiership, Noboru Takeshita sent 
the Cultural Mission to Southeast Asia in November 198720).  The Mission pointed out  
in its report the need to promote collaborative ICR projects with Southeast Asia [Japan 
Foundation 1988: 32-37].  The recommendation was taken into Takeshita’s initiative 
for Southeast Asian policy taking the form of the Japan-ASEAN Comprehensive 
Cultural Exchange Program, and establishment of the ASEAN Cultural Center within 
JF [MOFA 1987].  The Mission’s report encouraged Japanese ICR polices, as well as 
Southeast Asian policy.  A year after Takeshita’s message to ASEAN, the Premier 
announced “the Vision for International Cooperation” in the speech at his visit to 
London in January 1988.  He expressed in his speech that Japan was willing “to 
contribute to world peace and prosperity” via three measures namely, financial and civil 
commitment to peace-keeping operations, expanded ODA and further commitment to 
ICR policies.  
Behind Takeshita’s initiative was the international upheaval both at a 
                                                 
20)The mission consisted of major figures in the business community, academics, major cultural figures 
and directors of national/ non-national ICR agencies  
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regional and global level.  The former was the settlement of the Cambodian conflict.  
In the face of detente among conflicting parties in late 1987, the Japanese policymakers 
envisaged to play their once abandoned “political role”21 to broker peace in the region.  
Another was the political cataclysm in the Communist world.  As the end of the Cold 
War came into sight, Japanese policymakers understood that they were no longer 
allowed to sit still in the shelter of “the Western camp” and to watch the international 
order to be constructed [Kuriyama 1990].  Thus, again, their appreciation of RCC as a 
tool for contribution arose, aiming at Southeast Asia as its target.  
Right after the speech in London, Prime Minister Takeshita directly 
organized the Advisory Group on International Cultural Exchange (Kokusai Bunka 
Koryu ni Kansuru Kondankai)22).  The report was characterized by the idea which 
regards ICR policies as a tool for “contribution to the world well-being.” The report 
stood on the same point with the initiative in the 1970s, in the sense that they both 
assumed that international cultural exchange and cooperation foster mutual 
understanding among peoples, and enhances the diversity of the world’s cultures 
[Advisory Group on International Cultural Exchange 1989: 2].  On the other hand, the 
initiative in the late 1980s differed from the one in the 1970s in that it recognized the 
need to involve various agents such as NGOs, local governments, and individuals with 
ICR, and advocated to facilitate cooperation between the public and private sectors.  
Furthermore, the report propounded “the academic cooperation in the field which 
requires global efforts such as environmental conservation” [op.cit.: 9], and “enhancing 
the activities of ASEAN Cultural Center in order to promote interactive ICR policies 
among the parties” [op.cit.: 8]. It should be emphasized that those ideas reflected the 
concept and methods which grew up at non-national level in the1980s.  
 
4) Expanding “Asia” and RCC for “Symbiotic Relationship” 
The influence of non-national agents was well embodied in the JF ASEAN 
                                                 
21) [MOFA 1989: 144-146] and [Tanino 1988: 35] are eloquent about such aspirations to retrieve a 
“political role” in Southeast Asia.  
22) It is noteworthy that it was the first advisory group on ICR policies directly organized by a prime 
minister in the postwar Japan, for the fact that the policymakers urgently needed ICR policy.  
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Cultural Center.  When established in 1990, the Center merely provided data and 
information on both Japan and ASEAN with the purpose of “maintaining the mutuality 
of ICR with ASEAN nations” [Japan Foundation1988: 35].  Its scope and target of 
activities were remarkably expanded by the “Peace, Friendship and Exchange Initiative” 
(Heiwa Yuko Koryu Kiekaku) announced by Prime Minister Tonmi’ichi Murayama in 
1994.  The Initiative was the first national attempt to come to grips with the historic 
issue among Japan and other Asian countries [The University of Tokyo Study Group on 
International Cultural Relations,1999: 35].  As a part of it, the ASEAN Culture Center 
was reorganized into the Asia Center and expanded its target to broader Asia including 
China and South Korea.  What should be noted here is that the Center’s basic concept 
of “interactive ICR” was put into practice in the projects with those Asian countries.  
While conventional ICR projects by the national government such as 
“Japan-ASEAN Dialogue”（since 1977） were rather general consultations by major 
cultural figures [op.cit.: 47], the intellectual exchange programs by Asia Center were 
policy-oriented collaboration by experts of particular issues from Asian nations.  The 
Center aimed to construct and share “new history” among peoples in Asia via such 
collaboration with artists and academicians in the region [Advisory Group on 
International Cultural Exchange 1994: 8].  Its ultimate goal was to build a “symbiotic 
relationship” among them [Sato 1999: 118].  The Center’s projects like the 
“Intellectual Exchange Program” which supports academic research and conferences in 
the field of global issues like environment or security, and conservation of Asian 
cultural heritage, multinational collaboration theatre performance “King Lear” played in 
1997, aimed to network Asian intellectuals and artists [Sato 1999: 119, 121]23.  
RCC after the late 1980s depicted a sharp contrast with the ones in the 
former period in the following ways.  Firstly, they focused on the commonality among 
the parties.  Secondly, the projects were developed in the framework of “Asia” which 
includes Japan, Southeast Asia and Northeast Asian nations. Thirdly, issue-oriented and 
collaborative projects were rarely seen in the former period.  This new RCC was 
inherited by the successive national attempts thereafter.  For example, the Multilateral 
                                                 
23) Asia Center was disorganized and incorporated into other agencies within JF, as JF was reorganized 
into independent administrative institutions in April 2004. 
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Cultural Mission organized in 1997 consisted of artists and academics from Japan and 
ASEAN countries.  The mission aimed to collaborate in addressing conservation of 
cultural heirlooms in Asian countries, “which are in danger under rapid globalization” 
[Joint Secretariat of ASEAN-Japan Multilateral Cultural Mission 1998].  In regards to 
RCC with Northeast Asian nations, the national government has become proactive in its 
commitment to projects such as Japan-Republic of Korea National Exchange Year 
alongside the Soccer World Cup co-hosted by South Korea and Japan in 2002.  It is to 
be emphasized that such national RCC with Northeast Asian nations are backed by ICR 
at the grass-roots and local government level.  Most interesting of such grass-roots 
ICR is the penetration of popular culture.  Japanese Manga, Korean TV dramas and 
Chinese cinema are rapidly becoming popular among Asian nations.  For example, the 
Korean drama “Winter Sonata,” broadcast on Japanese national TV station in 2004, 
sparked the Korean boom and brought a 15% increase of Japanese tourists to South 
Korea in 2005.  Though it is more phenomenal than intentional, it is interesting that 
ICR in the broader sense propels narrow ICR policies like RCC24.  
In the meanwhile, the national RCC over historic issues among Japan, 
China and South Korea has stayed stagnant since the “Peace, Friendship and Exchange 
Initiative” in 1995.  Fueled by the problem of junior high school textbooks on history25, 
the tension between Japan and other Northeast Asian nations is mounting26.  Thus 
phenomenal ICR among Japan and other Northeast Asian countries is rising with 
                                                 
24 Meanwhile, pop culture does not necessarily fill the perceptional distance among nations. As 
anti-Japanese mob in Beijing after the Asia Cup Football final game between Japan and China shows, pop 
cultural exchange sometimes fuels the antipathy of contraries.  
25 The “history textbook problem” is the debate among Japan and other Northeast Asian nations over the 
interpretation of the Japanese invasion of China and Korea. It once got vigorous in 1982, and revived in 
2001 by an “ultra-nationalistic” Japanese textbook that cleared censorship by the Education Ministry in 
2001. 
26For example, 30% of respondents of the internet questionnaire survey by Chinese online portal 
Shanghai Searchina answered that the present China-Japan relation is “less favorable” while   12% felt 
“favorable.” Moreover, about 70% of the respondents pointed out that the most       important issue in 
future Sino-Japan relations will be the “history problem.” See Searchina   Marketing News 9 Jan. 2004 
(URL: 
http://marketing.searchina.net/report/disp.cgi?y=2004&d=0109&f=research_0109_001.shtml&mb=searc
hina, last downloaded on 1 Dec. 2005). 
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national ICR policies left far behind. 
Unlike European Cultural cooperation, the Japanese commitment to RCC 
toward Asia is neither organized nor rigidly institutionalized.  Since its change in the 
1980s, it developed into complex bilateral or multilateral networks at various levels 
which interact with each other.  But it is this interaction among national/non-national 
levels that brought new methods and ideas into Japanese RCC.  As for the Japanese 
national identity, such ideas and methods paved the way to change the structure of 
relationships between Japan and Asian nations.  Though the aspiration for becoming a 
“contributor to the world’s welfare” remains unchanged and even partly substantialized, 
the position of Asian nations seems to shift from “the area of activities to be supported” 
to “partner to work together with.” 
 
2-4.  “Germany in Europe,” “Japan and Asia”   
Comparing national commitments to RCC by Germany and by Japan, the 
cases seem to have three points in common.  
The first is that both countries used RCC as a tool to identify themselves in 
contemporary international society.  It is obviously observed in the “Grand Strategy” 
of Germany’s case, while Japanese attempts to build self-including “Asia” experienced 
ebb and flow.  
Secondly, it can be observed in both cases that the membership of the 
region is variable in reflection of the identities they pursue.  It appears more 
prominently in the Japanese case, but in the German case as well, the definition of 
“Europe” has always been controversial among the policymakers.  As discussed in this 
chapter, the pivot of European Cultural Cooperation is shifting to Eastern Europe in the 
post Cold War era.  Economic disparity among the new and old members cast a pall 
over “Europe with equal partnership.”  
The third point is that ICR as a phenomenon propels ICR as policy in both 
cases.  As for the case of Germany, the participants of German-Franco bilateral ICR 
projects lead the ICR in the next generations, and expand it into European-wide RCC.  
On the other hand, interaction of people, goods, information and ideas set off the 
definition of “Asia” and the style of Japanese ICR policies, and they were incorporated 
into national RCC projects via interaction between the national/non-national agents.  
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Meanwhile, we would like to mention the difference between RCC by 
Germany and Japan; that is, the structure of the relationship among the regional 
members.  As for RCC, Germany seems to be successful in embedding herself “in 
Europe,” while Japan is still at the beginning of forging a self-including “Asia” with 
equal partnership.  It is her peculiar identity that she “contributes to security in 
Southeast Asia, which is the area of responsibility under the umbrella of the US” that 
kept Japan away from building an “Asia” as essential as “Europe” to Germany.  In 
other words, the primary partner of Japan in the post war world was the US, not China 
or South Korea, or even the nations of Southeast Asia.  The national commitment to 
RCC over historic issues with Northeast Asian nations were left until the 1990s, and the 
perception gap among them still remains wide. 
Despite such experience, since the latter 1980s, Japan has started to express 
herself as a member of Asia and tries to construct a self-including region built upon 
collaborative relationships.  Just like non-national agencies like NGOs and local 
governments, the national agencies are developing RCC at various levels with various 
counterparts.  The Japanese national commitment to RCC requires further 
development of ICR with neighboring nations.  As the case of Germany in Europe 
suggests, quiet and sustainable dialogue, discussion and exchange among peoples of 
Asia as a whole will be the building blocks for building the region, expressed by the 
phrase “Japan in Asia.” 
 
3. Japanese Civil Society from ICR Perspectives 
3-1. Phenomenon observed 
When the Study Group on International Cultural Relations of Postwar 
Japan started their work, it was quite obvious that one of the most prominent 
phenomena of postwar Japanese international exchange was the explosive expansion of 
private sector activities in the 1980s.  The number of private organizations that are 
engaged in “cultural exchange or interaction” surged especially in local cities, 
characterizing decentralization of “internationalization27.”  The number was about 660 
                                                 
27 The term “internationalization” or “kokusai-ka” in Japanese was the catch word of the era, which 
implied that Japan must be socially and culturally prepared even on the level of common people and local 
community to survive in the world by aggressively communicating and interacting with the foreign 
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in 1971, and it has more than doubled to 1,540 by 1981, then to 2,600 in 1991 and 3,430 
in 1995.  So called “NGOs,” that is private organizations involved in overseas 
humanitarian aid28, were very small in number, only 20-30, in the early 1980s, but they 
also rapidly increased to about 200 in the late 1980s and 400 in 1995.  Not only in 
these citizen level activities, but also in the private corporate sector a similar 
phenomenon was observed.  During the 1980s the accumulated asset of private 
corporate foundations29 was tripled, of which the majority of newly established ones 
were to be engaged by their statutes in “international exchange” such as giving 
scholarships to foreign students.  And, many big multinational corporations started 
philanthropic activities in the same decade, under such rubrics as “corporate 
philanthropy”, “corporate citizenship”, and “corporate social responsibility [Study 
Group on International Cultural Relations of Postwar Japan 2005].”   
The phenomena were clear and simple.  The problem was how to interpret 
these phenomena and look for the causes and implications.  In the prewar and early 
postwar period until the 1970s, “international exchange” was almost a monopoly of the 
government with a few exceptions.  The exceptions, private international exchange 
organizations such as the International House of Japan and the Japan Center for 
International Exchange, functioned exclusively as the locus of activities of elite 
internationalist intellectuals 30 .  And, in general, Japan was considered to be a 
state-centric country where the private sector was deemed as an arena only for money 
                                                                                                                                               
countries and people, not like before as being inward-looking and shy. 
28 The literary meaning of NGO is non-governmental organization, so that it does not necessarily imply 
that they are involved in foreign humanitarian aid; however, in Japan the term is almost exclusively used 
for those organizations involved in foreign aid. 
29 In the United States, major private foundations are mostly family foundations established by 
millionaires such as the Rockefeller and the Ford Foundation; however, in Japan the major foundations 
are corporate ones mainly because of difference of the taxation system. 
30 It might be interesting to note that the International House of Japan was established by the suggestion 
and financial donation of John D. Rockefeller 3rd.  He was suggested by Foster Dulles, then the 
Secretary of State and the former President of the Rockefeller Foundation, to visit Japan and propose him 
how to flame new international cultural relations of postwar Japan. Dulles was anxious if Japan would be 
attracted by Chinese market and he wanted to keep Japanese people to be pro-America through cultural 
exchange with the U.S. and its allies. He thought that for that purpose private foundation is more effective 
than governmental programs. Rockefeller collaborated with Japanese old liberals to establish the 
International House of Japan in 1955 that almost dominated the early postwar cultural exchange with 
Rockefeller money and human contacts until the Japanese government has created the Japan Foundation, 
a governmental institution equivalent to British Council or Goethe Institute, in 1972. 
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making.  So, why the sudden and rapid increase of private organizations engaged in 




Our primary assumption was that this phenomenon of a rapid increase in 
the number of private agents in Japan could be related to the so-called “emerging civil 
society” phenomenon observed worldwide, started in late 1970 and expanded 
throughout the 1980s.  It seems to resemble, though much more speedy due to perhaps 
globalization effect, the process of “modernization” spread from the West to Asia and 
other parts of the world, so we considered the ICR theory, using such a process model 
of “cultural contact”, “conservative resistance”, “re-interpretation of foreign cultural 
elements”, and “re-arrangement of cultural whole by incorporating foreign elements31.” 
[Hirano 2000]  The result of our applying this model to the phenomenon with 
historical perspectives is available in the next section of the summary of the essay, 
“Evolution of ‘Civil Society’ and International Cultural Relations in Postwar Japan: 
Discourse and Reality,” included in the book, International Cultural Relations of 
Postwar Japan [Hirano 2005] (originally written in Japanese). 
However, the observed expansion of “civil society” worldwide might be 
different from modernization, which is strongly universal based on purely universal 
spheres of natural science and technology development.  It could be a version of 
ideology craze such as socialism or communism in the early 20th century.  It could be a 
parallel of the current spreading of liberal democracy or neo-liberalism after the end of 
the Cold War.  Until now it is not very clear if this civil society spreading worldwide is 
a post-Cold War phenomenon or a post nation-state one.  If claims such as “global civil 
society formation” become reality in the near future, the latter is to be plausible, but if 
the former is correct, the phenomenon could be short-lived. 
Although there were slight differences of opinions among co-researchers, 
our stances are generally cautious and maybe a little skeptical about the universality of 
civil society and our assumption remained same that the increase of private 
                                                 
31 Here, interrelation or mutual influence between broad ICR (phenomenal dimension) and narrow ICR 
(policy dimension) is considered to be problematic. 
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organizations is largely the response of the Japanese society to outside influences, not 
something genuinely outgrown from within the society itself due to mainly domestic 
causes.  We could not discard our concern that this could be a short term fashion of a 
sort of political ideology. 
 
3-3. How the ICR approach is different from other approaches to the civil society 
issue 
After publishing our book, a number of academic works on Japanese civil 
society appeared.  It might be interesting to think about the differences or hopefully 
advantages of the ICR approach vis-à-vis other approaches.  Here, we categorize these 
works into two types; area study approach (ASA) and comparative politics approach 
(CPA).   
The ASA is typical of the works compiled by Frank J. Schwartz and Suzan 
J. Pharr in The State of Civil Society in Japan [Schwartz and Pharr 2005].  The works 
included in this volume analyze Japanese civil society from different angles with rich 
contents.  The major difference, we realized, is that the ASA tends to start with the 
assumption that Japan is different from the West and it continues to be so.  In other 
words it stresses continuity or even un-changeability of Japanese-ness and pays less 
attention to the change of society and culture by foreign influences.  Typical of this 
attitude is that the civil society issue is reduced to one of relations between society and 
state, as the “civil” concept is too European and thus too foreign to Japanese minds, 
almost irrelevant.  Based on the ICR approach, on the other hand, we tried to depict 
and analyze how Japanese intellectuals struggled with this very foreign cultural concept, 
“civil,” and re-interpreted it in the Japanese context.   
In fact, shimin shakai, the Japanese translation of civil society, is widely 
used although different authors use this term quite differently, but it is not in Japan 
alone.  The core problem in the case of Japan is the notion of the moral individual of 
“civil,” as in the Japanese culture morality always stays within the society or group, not 
resting on the individual.  Without having absolute morality originating from God, the 
individual cannot stand alone morally, but rather interpersonal relationships are the 
basis for the social morality.  However, this fundamental difference of human 
existential philosophy did not hamper “modernization” and “democratization” of Japan, 
so why not civil society?  Actually, because the relative increase of civil society agents 
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vis-à-vis the state is clear as mentioned earlier, we can say to some extent that the 
Japanese state-centric feature is changing.  In this change, re-interpretation that is 
sometimes very much strategically done by leading figures has great significance 
because a majority of the Japanese, who have limited knowledge about the real meaning 
of civil society in the West, can only imagine something through the re-interpreted 
version of civil society discourse.  And, this re-interpreted discourse could change the 
perceptions of the people and institutions of the society as the foreign concepts much 
like democracy, modernization, freedom, and so on had a tremendous impact on 
Japanese social change after the Meiji Restoration in late 19th century. 
The CPA approach is represented here by the book compiled by Muthiah 
Alagappa, Civil Society and Political Change in Asia: Expanding and Contradicting 
Democratic Space, although recently quite a number of books covering the issue of civil 
society in Asia have appeared.  In his article in the book, Alagappa acknowledges the 
huge diversity of the Asian political economy and the state of civil society.  But, as the 
book proves, the authors seem to agree that comparison among Asian civil societies is 
not meaningless.  In our view, it is more beneficial to compare civil society between 
Japan and the U.S. rather than Japan and China as Japan was more influenced by 
America after the war than by China in the Middle Ages as far as civil society is 
concerned.  Although a resurgence of civil society may be initiated by East European 
intellectuals, the voice that reached Japan was not theirs but the articulated discourses of 
Western scholars.  The situation is similar throughout Asia.  The influence of Asian 
countries was almost non-existent compared with the influences of Western scholars.   
Also, it should be noted that in some developing countries, civil society 
discourse was associated with the democratization machinery of international aid.  The 
U.S. official development aid distributing institutions such as the Asia Foundation have 
been advocating civil society discourses in Asia and have given funding to local Asian 
NGOs in the name of creating and supporting civil societies in Asia for the purpose of 
democratizing these countries.  Not only in Africa, but also in some countries of Asia 
such as Cambodia, to a substantial degree “civil society” consisted of developmental 
NGOs that were in fact created by international aid agencies.  So, the civil society 
could be understood most in relation to Western countries, not in relation to neighboring 
Asian countries.  Thus, also in the case of Japan, we believe that civil society 
discourses and the emerging civil society organizations (NGOs, NPOs) associated with 
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them should be analyzed in ICR with the Western world. 
Secondly, what is important in our ICR approach and not in the CPA is the 
attention to local civil society discourses.  We feel that the global emergence of civil 
society organizations is caused to some extent by the spread of civil society discourses.  
The discourses were interpreted and applied differently in each country and stimulated 
the birth of local versions of civil society discourse that caused an increase in the 
number of actual private organizations.  The actual civil society situation and how its 
changes are different in each country of Asia could be analyzed by how civil society 
discourses were selectively introduced, reinterpreted, and how they stimulated the birth 
of local versions, reflecting the context of each country as well as the local scholars’ 
creativity. 
 
3-4. Evolution of ‘Civil Society and ICR in Postwar Japan: Discourse and Reality32
In the 1980s exchange activities by private organization have seen a rapid 
expansion both in terms of volume and quality.  In addition to the private activities, it 
is also characteristic of the 1980s that local governments appeared as another agent of 
international exchange activities.  What do these phenomena mean? 
The essay tries to analyze this phenomenon not only by focusing on agent 
analysis, but also by looking at the discourses that were associated with and are 
considered to have supported and stimulated these substantial changes of the agents. 
If we look at the development of civil society at both the substantial level 
as well as the discourse level in postwar Japan, we can identify three major local 
versions of civil society discourse: “people to people diplomacy” discourse in the 
middle 1970s, NGO discourse in the 1980s, and NPO discourse in the 1990s that first 
appeared and were influential in each period. 
The first discourse which appeared that seems to be related to the Japanese 
civil society discourse was “people to people diplomacy” or minsai discourse, 
advocated by the Kanagawa Prefecture governor Kazuji Nagasu.  Nagasu was one of 
the symbols of “progressive local governments” in the 1970s and early 1980s, being the 
                                                 
32 While preparing this article, I did not mechanically summarize the original paper, but up-dated and 
changed it slightly so as to reflect the change of situation after the publication of the original as well as to 
fit the purpose of the presentation at the conference.  I believe that the changes are minor, but it might be 
safer to say that this summary contains my current reinterpretation of the original paper. 
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governor of the most progressive prefecture from 1975 for 20 years.   
The second epoch in the evolution of Japanese civil society was the 
emergence of NGOs, private civic organizations engaged primarily in foreign aid and 
advocacy for the cause of women, environment, or peace.  The year of 1980 is called 
“Year One of the Japanese NGO” as many NGOs were established to work for 
Cambodian refugees in Thai boarder camps, who fled from their homeland because of 
the outbreak of the civil war between Pol Pot’s army and the invading Vietnamese in 
1979.  The NGO discourse was accompanied by the emergence of actual NGOs, and it 
supported the increasing NGOs by highly evaluating their relative advantages as 
flexible and effective donors over government in development aid giving.   
The third and probably the climax was the passage of the so-called “NPO 
law” by the parliament in 1998.  The law was made by negotiations between the 
networks of private non-profit organizations, including NGOs and domestic groups, and 
the bureaucracy and political parties.  The major gain of the civil society was 
loosening of the firm governmental control over private non-profit organizations that 
seek legal status.  It is not any more necessary to be approved by the government, and 
the government has no authority to screen them when they apply for registration.  
There were concerns that loose government control over private non-profit registration 
could lead to abuse of this legal status by for-profit businessman and organized crime, 
and they proved to be partly true; however, the benefit of healthy citizen activities was 
prioritized.  The impact of a huge number of volunteers, gathered to the ruins of 
Hanshin Awaji Great Earthquake in Kobe city in 1995, gave a big push to the movement 
of private organizations to secure public acknowledgement and trust, thus negotiating 
power vis-à-vis the politicians and bureaucracy.  In the course of law making, “NPO” 
discourse played a significant role. 
 
1) . Kanagawa Prefecture’s “People to People Diplomacy” and Its Limitations 
Started in the 1963 local elections, progressive local governments with such 
leaders as Yokohama City Mayor Kazuo Asukata and Tokyo Prefecture Governor 
Ryokichi Minobe have prevailed nation-wide.  In the movement political agencies were 
considered to be no more a labor class, but “citizens.”  The vision was to set a “civil 
minimum” and realize “civil welfare by citizen participation [Matsushita 1996:33].”    
While domestically on the local government level, as mentioned above, 
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“democratic polity based on citizens” was pursued by progressive local leaders, on the 
international front in the 1970s Japan experienced the Nixon Shock and the deepening 
international mutual dependence.  Yoshikazu Sakamoto, the leading progressive 
political scientist, tried to capture the time’s trend with a concept, “people to people 
relations,” that was replacing international relations according to him.  He pointed out 
that in the relations among developed countries, tremendous goods, information, and 
human exchange occurred on the private level and these “people to people” relations 
were rapidly increasing their predominance over “government to government” relations 
and thus could be post nation-state phenomena and the key for future international 
peace.  And he also stressed that Japan’s “people to people” relations with Asia are not 
sufficiently developed and thus should be promoted [Sakamoto 1972]. 
Influenced by Sakamoto, Nagasu advocated “people to people” diplomacy 
by assuming citizens as the agents of international relations while trying to make local 
government independent as much as possible from the central government, which was 
seized by the conservative LDP during the postwar period, by promoting citizen’s 
participation in local governance and policy making.  The fact that Kanagawa 
Prefecture had the most numerous American military bases next to Okinawa was an 
immanent inevitability for the conflict between the central and local governments and 
thus the local government has some legitimacy to pursue independent “diplomacy” 
different from the central one on behalf of the local residents.   
Nagasu was an academician of economics by profession and was one of the 
advocates of “structural reform,” the new line of the Socialist Party program, adopted in 
1960.  The core of this theory, according to Nagasu, was direct democracy through 
citizen participation.  He interpreted that the original purpose of Marxism was to create 
the society as a new association of free individuals, and he conceptualized as “formation 
of civil society” the creation of a society in which civic values were to be embodied 
through the democracy of direct participation “from below.”  He saw the emergence of 
citizen’s activities in the 1960s as the birth of the “citizen” in Japan, who was supposed 
to exercise grassroots democracy [Nagasu 1969; 1973].  However, at the same time, he 
also proposed that the progressive leadership should organize mass movements to 
realize civil society [Nagasu 1969:126-129], which contradicted his idea of reform 
“from below.”  To resolve this conceptual conflict, he placed the local government 
between the citizens and the progressive leadership as the “secretariat” of “civil 
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society,” the coordinating body [Nagasu and Sakamoto1983]. 
He paid special attention to the relations of Japan with Asia as the target of 
“people to people” diplomacy where he found the only possible way for Japan to 
survive by pursuing the international cultural relations of equality, self-determination, 
coexistence, and co-prosperity.  He was critical of Japanese foreign aid that he 
concluded to be self-centered and having a deep conceptual gap with Asian countries 
because Japan in her modernization process had neither democratization nor the 
creation of civil society [Nagasu 1971]. 
In order to implement his “people to people” diplomacy, he set up a bureau 
for international exchange in his local government office in 1976 and in the following 
year also established Kanagawa International Association (KIA), a local government 
affiliated organization.  KIA was the first of this sort that were established in other 
local prefectures in 1980s and 1990s.  The Ministry of Foreign Affairs was furious 
with this revolt of a local government to their basic principle of unity of diplomacy and 
the central government intimidated Kanagawa prefecture by abusing its authority over 
local government. 
In addition to conventional international activities of local government such 
as sister city friendship, Nagasu emphasized the eminent importance of emerging 
Japanese NGOs, working for Cambodian refugees in Thai border camps.  He was 
especially fond of the Japan Volunteer Center, and he visited their project sites in 
refugee camps in Thailand and delivered the donation money to JVC by himself.  He 
also allowed JVC to have their desk at KIA for their public relations activities.  In his 
eye, newly born Japanese NGOs were the evidence of an emerging genuine civil society, 
while the central government was critical of NGOs as they were amateur and lacking in 
accountability.  Later, KIA established the endowment fund to support NGOs in 
Kanagawa by securing finances from the local government budget as well as citizen’s 
donations. 
His “people to people” diplomacy has great impact on the policies of other 
local governments.  Many followed the good example of the “progressive prefecture” 
and started similar activities though they were not as antagonistic with the central 
government as Kanagawa in early days of Nagasu’s governorship.  Later in the decade, 
the Ministry of Home Affairs pushed this movement and guided all local governments 
to have their own international policy encouraging them to establish international 
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associations like KIA.  In the 1990s the largest agent of government’s international 
exchange activities was no longer the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and its affiliates, but 
the Home Ministry with many local governments. 
Nagasu’s “people to people” diplomacy showed its limitation when its 
focus turned to the issue of Koreans and other immigrants.  Kanagawa was one of the 
most populous areas of Koreans who migrated from the Korean Peninsula during the 
imperial period.  Some of them were forced to come and work for industries located in 
Kanagawa and in general they were discriminated against by Japanese people.  Most 
of them returned to their homeland when Japan was defeated, but around eight hundred 
thousand remained for various reasons.  The Japanese government divested them of 
Japanese nationality when she regained sovereignty and they were put in insecure status 
for a long time.  They were denied their civil rights and related privileges due to the 
lack of nationality.  Still, most of them did not want “naturalization” due to their 
attachments to their homeland and their resentment towards the Japanese government. 
In the 1980s Korean movements demanding civil rights flared up.  Nagasu 
named his approach to this issue of the legacy of imperialism “internal 
internationalization,” meaning that the frontline of “people to people” relations is not 
limited to issues beyond national boundaries, but also between non-Japanese and 
Japanese inside Japan, above all in his own prefecture of Kanagawa.  Nagasu intended 
to include foreign residents in Kanagawa as the target of local government services by 
defining them as “Kanagawa residents of foreign origins,” not as foreigners without 
Japanese nationality and citizenship [Kanagawa Prefecture 1995].  However, 
Kawasaki City and Osaka City, where the Korean populations were largest and thus 
their movements were strongest, have outstripped Kanagawa in such matters as 
abandoning fingerprint compulsion for alien registration, removing the nationality 
clause from local government employment code, and establishing a city council of 
foreign residents.  Currently, some staff of KIA say that Kanagawa started earlier but 
has now been left behind. 
One of the reasons why Nagasu and Kanagawa could not catch up with the 
Korean movements for civil rights was that in his definition of “citizen,” which is 
supposed to be the agent of creating civil society, Koreans were not included, but rather 
were considered to be someone helped and cared for by “citizens.”  His paternalistic 
approach was criticized and rejected by Koreans who were excluded from the society 
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and thus from the “citizenry.”  The civil rights were not given from the progressive 
leader and merciful “citizens,” but were gained through political struggle of the 
marginalized against local governments as agents of the state.   
Nagasu and his advisors were all intellectuals of the Left, who never held 
government after the war, knew well about Western political theories and had the will to 
apply their new program within the political space available around local government.  
It is noteworthy that the key concept of their theory was “civil society” as early as the 
mid-1970s, although as mentioned above there were limitations in their paternalistic 
approach inherited perhaps from the Leninism legacy of progressive leadership as 
advance guard; their inability to conceive and empower the marginalized as the agent of 
social change; and the “outside in” method of a “people to people” diplomacy-centered 
approach to “creating civil society.”  Their difficulty was deprived from the very fact 
that civil society as an independent political sphere was thin in Japan and thus they had 
to “create” civil society strong enough to be the agent of their political reform.  The 
local government was the tool for that purpose, but because of that the local government 
became the major agent in international cultural relations after Nagasu, working in the 
sphere close to civil society. 
 
2) Emergence of NGOs working for international causes in the 1980s 
As mentioned earlier, Nagasu was very impressed by NGOs established by 
citizens which worked for Cambodian refugees and seemed to him to symbolize an 
emerging new civil society, something different from old civil society symbolized by 
labor organizations.  The NGO is a recent phenomenon in Japan that started in early 
1980 with a few earlier exceptions.  From 1979 to 1982 forty three NGOs were 
established, almost all of which were responses to the influx of Cambodian refugees to 
Thailand border camps and they later became the core group of the Japanese NGO 
sector [JANIC 1998]. 
JVC was established in Bangkok, Thailand by a group of people with 
diverse backgrounds such as housewives, journalists, diplomats, social workers, 
business people, UN staff, academics, students, and young company employees who got 
short leave from work to act as volunteers.  The term suitable to call the group would 
be “citizens” even if one would not agree to the “civil society” discourse of Nagasu.  
The motivation behind the inception of this small NGO was related to the motivation 
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that the Western NGOs gathered to the refugee camps gave to the Japanese relief-related 
people and volunteers.  Among 57 emergency relief teams only 4 were governmental, 
including Japan, and others were all experienced Western NGOs.  The people came to 
refugee camps and observed the activities of Western NGOs witnessed with their eyes 
the very existence of NGO for the first time and thought similar NGOs were necessary 
for Japan as well [JVC 1990].   
The Japanese NGOs, symbolized here by JVC, seemed to follow the same 
generational evolution theorized by David Korten and others [Korten 1990].  While 
the first generation is mainly dedicated to emergency relief and usually maintains 
political neutrality developed through the activities of the Red Cross, the second 
generation tends to focus on developmental issues and to pay more attention to local 
communities.  This turn from the first to second generation occurred in the case of 
JVC when it started its own projects in Cambodia while continuing its relief activities in 
Thai border camps.  The JVC activities in the second generational period realized in 
their participation in International NGO Forum on Cambodia and Cambodia 
Coordination Committee, NGO consortiums placed in Phnom Penh, initiating local 
projects in South Africa as a consequence of their campaign against apartheid, and the 
relief activities to local Iraqi people during the Gulf War [JVC 2000].   
The third generation of the JVC activities is more political than before, for 
example; advocacy related to the first Cambodian election; humanitarian relief to 
politically controversial North Korea; and also humanitarian aid to internationally 
isolated Serbs being inspired by the NGO statement requiring immediate stoppage of air 
bombing by NATO.  JVC intentionally put itself in the situation where justices are 
contending with each other and aggressively pursued the controversial aid programs in 
the situation where the justice of powers tends to prevail.  In the third generational 
activities, the advocacy became more instrumental in appealing to its unique position 
and deliberations as an NGO to the Japanese government and other official entities for 
their policy changes and the networking with other organizations became more 
necessary to gather support.  Currently JVC joins in more than seven NGO networks 
as an institution, and the JVC staffs are members of seven other networks.  Worthy of 
mention here is that JVC was invited by Oxfam International to become a member 
although JVC finally declined this offer after a year of deliberation.  It might also be 
interesting that NGO discourses had some impact in the course of its development.  
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These discourses were generated based on the examples of European NGOs, not 
American ones.  In the 1980s so many visitors repeatedly asked the same questions 
that famous NGOs in Europe such as Oxfam and NOVIB restricted Japanese visitors. 
In terms of quality of activities, as indicated by the JVC case, Japanese 
NGOs have almost caught up with Western NGOs within a relatively short period of 
time, following generational evolution depicted by Korten drawn from Western NGO 
experiences.  However, in terms of quantity the Japanese NGO sector shows a very 
poor profile, which could be said to be under the “poverty line,” considering Japan’s 
economic power.  Foreign visitors to Japanese NGOs are often frightened by the 
working conditions of NGO staff.  The office rooms in a small building are tiny and 
congested.  If one wants to work for an NGO, he or she must give up stable family life, 
although the salary and benefits have become far better than decades ago.  Their scale 
of activities in terms of budget is minimal compared to major Western NGOs. 
Two main reasons could be pointed out.  One is little money flow from the 
government into NGO finances, and another is the small number of their membership.  
In most European countries and the U.S. 20-30 percent of the official development 
assistance (ODA) money goes to NGOs, which are to be spent by NGOs on behalf of 
the government.  However, in Japan, there remains resentment on the side of NGOs 
and also public opinion to pipe substantial ODA money because NGOs would be easily 
co-opted by the government should they receive funding from them.  In fact, there are 
a lot of quasi-governmental or quasi-private organizations that receive government 
funds and are controlled by it working as an extension of the government.  Once it 
receives continual financial subsidy, it is widely believed that it should accept 
government retired personnel as members of the management.  It is true that the flow 
of money from government to NGOs has increased gradually over the last decade, but it 
is not yet substantial enough to change the scale and character of NGOs.  In order to 
maintain the character of NGOs as a civil society organization while getting 
government funding, it is widely recognized that they should raise more funds from the 
public through donations/membership fees and sales of their services or some kind of 
business.   
Thus, the first problem is related to the second that is more fundamental 
and serious.  The membership of NGO is rather limited compared to the scale of 
Japan’s population.  The membership is not only an indicator of financial resources, 
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but also of social recognition and popular support. One reason is the lack of capability 
and willingness of NGOs with respect to advertisements and public relations.  They 
tend to ignore or dislike commercial advertisement techniques, being scrupulously aid 
oriented.  However, another reason lies on the public side, i.e. that the people who 
have global or even social concerns and commit themselves through volunteering or 
donations are absolutely small in number.  If allowed to call them “citizens,” here 
again we should say that the citizen segment is thin in the society.  We counter now the 
same problem of non existence of civil society that could counter the strong state.  
Currently, Koizumi’s conservative regime is trying to make the government small by 
privatization, liberalization of regulations and so on; however, it is unknown if small 
government policy from above automatically creates strong civil society on the ground. 
 
3) NPO discourses and NPO law 
Although Japan was democratized through occupation by U.S. military 
forces, the mainstream of postwar intellectual discourses was in general not 
pro-America.  The earlier half of the occupation, when the blue print of 
democratization prepared during the war by the State Department such as liberalization 
of labor movements, land reform, democratic educational reform, purge of militarist 
from public offices, and dismantling conglomerates was in order, was honey moon 
period for those intellectuals that suffered during the war; however, the Cold War 
strategic thinking that emerged in the late 40s and early 50s in the U.S. administration 
and the change of occupation policy to remilitarize Japan and utilize it as a base for its 
anti-communist world strategy was not favored by Japanese intellectuals who 
considered it a kind of betrayal to its promise of peace and democracy.  The situation 
remained roughly the same until the end of the Vietnam War, after which at least in Asia 
the U.S. anti-communist offensive showed a clear slow down.   
After the mid 1970s, different versions of civil society discourses 
originating in the U.S. were introduced from time to time.  They were “private 
philanthropy,” “third sector,” “voluntarism,” “corporate citizenship,” and “non-profit 
organizations (NPO) or non-profit sector.”  The last and most influential was the NPO 
discourse.  They shared the common features of being based on Parsonsian structural 
functionalism; emphasize importance or advantages of private sector vis-a-vis 
government; and more or less corporatism oriented or non-conflictive with the market 
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economy. 
The agents that introduced these discourses to Japan were private 
institutions such as the Japan Center for International Exchange (JCIE), the Toyota 
Foundation (TF), and the Sasakawa Peace Foundation (SPF).  They had close 
relationships with American private philanthropic foundations, especially the 
Rockefeller Foundation and the Ford Foundation.  It could be said that these 
organizations with their leaders such as Tadashi Yamamoto of JCIE, Yujiro Hayashi of 
TF, and Akira Iriyama of SPF are a sort of Japanese postwar liberals and favored 
American social system that differs substantially from Japan.  They thought that the 
state-centered Japanese system with its strong power of bureaucracy should be changed 
or modified by empowering private philanthropy or the third sector.  The taste of their 
arguments was rather of elitism, directed at reform from the top, and naturally of the 
social engineering sort.  
The discourses directed at the corporate sector, i.e. the need for corporate 
philanthropy or corporate citizenship, were accepted by major Japanese corporations 
mainly members of Keidanren, the largest association of big industries.  In 1990 
Keidanren stared its One Percent Club that encouraged its member corporations to 
donate one percent of their profits for philanthropic activities.  In this JCIE was the 
major advocate by doing research for Keidanren.  The SPF was the major agent in 
advocating the discourse of corporate citizenship, then fashionable in the U.S.  They 
argued that corporations have obligations to contribute to the public interest as citizens 
of the society like individuals. 
The focus of discourse, as described above, originally was addressed to the 
elite core of the society such as Keidanren, but later shifted to target grassroots level 
organizations.  Until then, the grassroots level civic movements were generally guided 
by the left and antagonistic to the government and big business.  The anti-pollution 
movements were typical of the sort and Minamata and other victims of the dangerous 
pollution caused by the industry were symbols of the movements.  The civic peace 
movements against the atomic bomb, the American war in Asia, and problems related to 
U.S. bases were usually anti-America and thus opposed to the government that had kept 
Japan one of the closest allies of the U.S.  The student movements that reached their 
climax in the 1960s were heavily influenced by the left or leftist thinking and strongly 
anti-LDP lead government and anti-capitalism.  All these leftist social movements on 
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the grassroots level, in a sense, failed as far as their ultimate goal of fundamental social 
change is concerned.  The government remained to be controlled by the conservative 
LDP throughout the postwar period and the power has been continuously held by the 
iron triangle of the bureaucracy, the big corporations and the LDP.  By the latter half of 
the 1970s grassroots social movements were in a slump and segregated from each other, 
pursuing very narrow causes of their own. 
The advocates of civil society discourse of the liberal sort tried to revitalize 
the grassroots activities by networking and depoliticizing them.  The argument was 
that the leftist civic movements only demanded that the government do or not do 
something, but did nothing by themselves.  They supposed that by taking hold of the 
government, all could be attained, and if not, nothing could be gained.  So, the term 
was proposed to be changed from civic movements to civic activities.  Now that the 
success of the civic activities do not mean “take all or nothing,” but how far they could 
approach the goal by their own efforts.   
The unified demand of these civic groups, guided by liberal civil society 
discourse, was liberalization of the government control over civic groups.  So far, it 
was required that official approval of an appropriate ministry be obtained to be 
registered as a private legal entity and usually ministries did not give their approval 
easily.  The Civic Code legislated in the Meiji period provides two general types of 
legal personality to private organizations, but both types of legal status were not easily 
obtained due to strict government regulations.  Also, they have to report to the 
government every year and should obey the order of the supervising ministry.  Other 
types of private legal status were legalized by different laws; for example, schools were 
prescribed by the school organization law and put under the supervision of the Ministry 
of Education.  In fact, it was almost impossible for civic groups on the grassroots level 
o be incorporated and thus they had difficulty in obtaining social acknowledgement and 
trust.  They were unable to enter into contracts, so it was impossible to rent an office or 
borrow money from the bank as an organization.  In most cases a representative of the 
group had to take all the risks as an individual.   
Many different types of civic groups made a nationwide network and 
coordinated themselves to demand that the government enact a new law for them to lift 
hitches and obstacles to work in society.  In short, they demanded more freedom from 
state control. 
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Thousands of volunteers gathered at the ruins of the Hanshi Awaji Great 
Earthquake that killed more than 5,000 people in 1995 were the spurs for their advocacy 
for voluntarism and the advantage of private activities over the government bureaucracy.  
The term, NPO, became fashionable in the press, overtaking NGO, after the earthquake.  
This term is taken from the U.S. civil society discourse and used like NGO without 
being translated into a Japanese term.  The term might be most popular in Japan, being 
much more prevalent than in the U.S.  “NPO” is used strategically by implicating that 
the civic groups are not anti-government, but complementary to the government being 
apolitical and service oriented; they are also complementary to for-profit corporations 
and thus market friendly; and they are institutions for self support of citizens. 
 
3-4. Current situation 
The author thinks that the above three elements of the civil society, 
progressive local governments and their affiliates, NGOs working for international 
development, and NPOs providing basic services to the local needed, are the ones who 
articulated their legitimacy of existence by using the term, civil society.  They had 
their own meaning and implications of “civil” or “citizen” in the Japanese context with 
their own political strategy.  Here the term “political” means that they had their visions 
for the future of the Japanese society and their will to change it.  By focusing these 
social elements, this chapter intentionally focuses on the sphere where Japan interacts 
with the outside world, or more precisely the Western world, and thus it is biased in 
being change-oriented, looking at how Japan has changed through foreign cultural 
contact.  Acknowledging that the civil society encompasses other more conventional 
or traditional spheres such as communal, religious, industrial, and labor organizations, 
the authors cannot find any significance in examining these organizations just to draw 
the predictable conclusion that the state dominates civil society in Japan.  This has 
been widely known for a long time.  The very point of using civil society as an 
analytical concept is to know how much possibility there is for civil society to prevail 
and change the state-civil society relation.   
The rapid increase of private sector organizations in ICR in the 1980s was 
caused by socio-economic causes as well as socio-cultural ones.  The former are 
simply formulated based on the fact that the globalization of people, goods, money, and 
information flow that occurred in the 1970-80s stimulated the Japanese people to set up 
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these organizations.  The latter, as explained in this chapter, are more complex, 
nuanced, and context-related.  They are also related to the purposes of these 
organizations, their vision, political orientations and the substance of changes that 
occurred.  The purposes are articulated in a general form in each discourse that 
appeared from time to time, i.e., “people to people diplomacy,” “NGO,” and “NPO” 
discourses.  At the same time, these discourses influenced and in general encouraged 
increases in the number of substantial organizations.   
Currently, they all exist simultaneously and continue to be the most active 
cause-oriented part of civil society in Japan, although they have different initial and 
current political orientations.  If it is acceptable to focus our attention on this part of 
the Japanese civil society, it is not irrelevant to compare Japanese civil society and 
American or European civil society rather than to analyze Japanese civil society within 
the geographical framework of Asia.  It could be more fruitful to compare Japanese 
and American NPOs as service providers within the liberal welfare state system than to 
compare Japanese traditional communal organizations with their Chinese counterparts, 
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